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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, HOLBROOK FIRE 
DISTRICT UNIT, 
TChargirig^Pafty, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18646 
HOLBROOK FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, LLP . (CHRISTOPHER VENATOR of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case has been remitted to us by the Appellate Division, Third Department1 for 
an independent review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the 
Holbrook Fire District (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it brought disciplinary charges against one of its employees, 
Jason Feinberg, in retaliation for his efforts in attempting to organize District employees for 
; 
:CSEA, Inc. v. PERB, 267 AD2d 935, 32 PERB H7027 (3d Dep't 1999). 
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representation by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Holbrook Fire District Unit (CSEA).2 
The ALJ found that Feinberg had been charged with eight counts of misconduct 
from March 1996 through September 1996, the time during which he was actively 
organizing support among his fellow employees for an employee organization, that the 
District Manager, Deborah Knopfke, knew he was engaged in organizational activity and 
that the business reasons given by the District for preferring charges against Feinberg 
were pretextual. Determining that Feinberg had been subjected to disparate and 
retaliatory treatment by the District in that others who had committed the same or similar 
offenses as Feinberg had not been disciplined and that some of the offenses attributed to 
Feinberg involved duties that were ancillary to his job of fire dispatcher and did not warrant 
the penalty of discharge, the ALJ found that the District had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) 
of the Act. 
The parties submitted the case to the ALJ for decision based upon a stipulated 
record, consisting of the appellate return in a proceeding brought pursuant to Civil Practice 
Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 78 to review the decision of the Civil Service Law (CSL) §75 
hearing officer on the disciplinary charges that were brought against Feinberg by the 
District. The hearing officer sustained six of eight charges against Feinberg and 
recommended his discharge. The return includes the disciplinary charges against 
2On March 11, 1996, the Holbrook Fire District Association fiied a petition 
seeking to represent a unit of employees of the District. On June 17, 1996, the 
Association withdrew its petition. On September 3, 1996, CSEA filed a petition seeking 
to represent a unit of firehouse attendant, custodian, watchman, mechanic, district 
secretary and HVAC mechanic. That petition was dismissed pursuant to the 
employees' vote against representation. Holbrook Fire Dist, 30 PERB 1J3035 (1997). 
i 
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1
 Feinberg, the CSL §75 hearing transcript, the exhibits and the hearing officer's report and 
recommendations. Both parties also submitted briefs to the ALJ. 
In deciding the exceptions filed by the District and the cross-exceptions filed by 
CSEA, we determined that the ALJ had erred by failing to defer to the findings of the §75 
hearing officer that the charges against Feinberg were brought by the District for 
appropriate business reasons and not to retaliate against him for his organizing activities. 
We, therefore, reversed the decision of the ALJ and dismissed the improper practice 
charge against the District. 
Pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, CSEA sought review of our determination.'The 
matter was transferred from Supreme Court, Albany County to the Appellate Division, 
Third Department. The court found: 
) 
[T]he relevant inquiry in a proceeding pursuant to Civil Service 
Law §75 is very different than that in an improper practice 
proceeding under Civil Service Law §209-a. In the former, the 
focus is upon whether there was cause for the employee's 
dismissal, (citation omitted) In the latter, it is whether the 
employer' action was motivated by anti-union animus and "it is 
irrelevant...whether or not cause for the employer's action in 
terminating [the employee] actually existed." (citation omitted)3 
The court further found that the §75 hearing officer had not fully considered the dispositive 
issue in the improper practice proceeding and remitted the matter to us for further 
proceedings consistent with its decision. 
Based upon our review of the entire record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
. ; : 
3CSEA v. PERB, supra note 1 at 7045-46. 
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FACTS 
The underlying facts in this case are set forth more fully in our earlier decision4 and 
in the ALJ's decision,5 which adopted the factual findings of the §75 hearing officer.6 
Feinberg was actively attempting to organize District employees on behalf of CSEA 
at all times relevant to the charge. His supervisor, Knopfke, was aware of his organizing 
efforts at least by February 1996.7 The District filed the CSL §75 charges on October 10, 
1996. The charges alleged that on March 18,1996, Feinberg had allowed unauthorized 
personnel in the radio room and that he engaged in a prank in the radio room; that he 
failed to timely complete an assignment given to him on May 13, 1996; that he failed to 
follow proper procedures for requesting time off on three occasions in June 1996; that he 
failed to complete the printing and filing of eight monthly reports for the State of New York; 
and that he failed to maintain a New York State Commodities Contract book. The §75 
431 PERB 1J3084 (1998). 
531 PERB |[4589(1998). 
6The ALJ rejected the District's claim, raised for the first time in its brief, that the 
hearing officer's decision be given collateral estoppel effect. However, the ALJ properly 
adopted the factual findings of the CSL §75 hearing officer, submitted by the parties as 
part of their stipulated record. In State of New York (ben Aaman) 11 PERB 1J3084, at 
3138 (1978), the Board found that an ALJ properly relied upon the determination of the 
facts found by an arbitrator in a related grievance arbitration, thereby precluding 
relitigation of the issue in the improper practice charge. The basis of this conclusion 
was that the criteria in New York City Transit Auth., 4 PERB H3031, at 3670 (1971), 
were satisfied. Those criteria are that "the issues raised by the improper practice charge 
were fully litigated in the arbitration proceeding, that arbitral proceedings were not 
tainted by unfairness or serious procedural irregularities and that the determination of 
the arbitrator was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the . . .Act." 
7See HolbrookFire District, 30 PERB P062 (1997), where it was determined 
that the District, and Knopfke in particular, were aware of Feinberg's organizing 
activities by February 1996. 
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hearing officer sustained all of these charges and recommended that Feinberg be 
discharged.8 
DISCUSSION 
To establish the improper motivation necessary for a 
finding that §209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act have been violated, 
the charging party has the burden of proving engagement in 
protected activitiesrthatthe-employer had knowledgeof the — 
activities and that it acted because of those activities. If a prima 
facie violation has been established by direct evidence or by 
circumstantial evidence, the burden shifts to the respondent to 
rebut that violation by proof that legitimate business reasons 
prompted the action, (footnotes omitted)9 
Here, the record establishes that Feinberg was engaged in protected activity and 
that his supervisor was aware of his activities. Beyond that, no facts are present in the 
stipulated record that would prove that Feinberg would not have been disciplined for his 
wrong-doing but for his protected activities.10 A charging party's mere contact with 
protected activity does not shield him from otherwise lawful action.11 
CSEA relied on the timing of the disciplinary action, which occurred during 
Feinberg's organizational activities, alleged disparate treatment of Feinberg in response to 
the March 1996 incidents and the argued de minimis nature of the other charged offenses 
to establish the third prong of the test. 
8Two other charges of misconduct were dismissed by the hearing officer. 
^Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022, at 3051-52 (1996). 
10See CSEA v. PERB, 32 PERB 1J7010 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1999). 
"State of New York (OMRDD), 24 PERB fl3036 (1991); Brunswick Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 19 PERB 1J3063 (1986). 
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As to timing, while a close proximity in time between a protected activity and an 
adverse action may be sufficient to raise a suspicion of a causal relationship, a 
coincidence of events alone is insufficient to justify such an inference.12 While 
characterized by CSEA as proof of disparate treatment in support of the charge, that the 
other employees who were present in the radio room and who engaged in the prank with 
Feinberg on March 18, 1996 and the later, similar, prank that day were not disciplined13, 
does not establish animus.14 We do not agree that because the other employees were 
also involved in some way with pranks in the radio room, that Feinberg was treated 
disparately by the District. Feinberg was reprimanded at the time for his conduct and 
admitted that he had acted inappropriately. The District was free to deal with the other 
employees as it saw fit based upon their employment records at the time and their further 
conduct. Feinberg's "conduct and attitudes took a further precipitous decline" after the 
March 1996 incidents so the District included the incidents in the disciplinary charges that 
were filed in October 1996. The record does not show that any of the other employees 
involved in the pranks engaged in any subsequent misconduct. 
Finally, the ALJ dismissed the other acts of misconduct on Feinberg's part as not 
serious enough to warrant the discharge of an otherwise "very good" employee and 
thereby attributed animus to the District because of the "implausibility of [its] proffered 
nBoard ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 13 PERB fl4592 
(1980), affd, 14 PERB H3005 (1981). 
13The other employee, who acted in concert with Feinberg, received a counseling 
memorandum. 
uRockville Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3050 (1999).(appeal pending) 
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business justifications." We are not willing to draw the same conclusions from our reading 
of the stipulated record.15 Feinberg engaged in various acts of commission and omission, 
he admitted that he had done so, and he was found by the §75 hearing officer to be guilty 
of six of the eight charges brought against him. As we noted in Rockville Centre Union 
Free School District, "insubordination and failure to comply with mandatory [requirements 
for use of leave time] are not trivial matters."16 
CSEA must satisfy its burden of proof by a preponderance of the credible 
evidence.17 No connection was established in this case between Feinberg's union activity 
and the disciplinary charges. Thus, CSEA has failed to establish the third necessary 
element of proof to sustain the charge. It is only when the charging party meets its burden 
on each of the three elements of proof that the respondent must then rebut that proof and 
demonstrate that its conduct was for proper business reasons.18 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the District's exceptions and reverse the decision 
oftheALJ. 
^Supra note 12. 
™Supra note 14, at 3116. 
17-1 That is the standard we have held charging parties must satisfy. See, e.g., 
State of New York (Division of Human Rights), 22 PERB ^3036 (1989). 
187bM7 of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1990). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Xbbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-21488 
- and -
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, INC., 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-21525 
- and -
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 
Respondent. 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN and JESSICA 
S. WEINSTEIN of counsel), for City of White Plains 
SOLOMON, RICHMAN, GREENBERG, P.C. (HARRY GREENBERG and 
LORI B. SKLAR of counsel), for Police Benevolent Association of the City 
of White Plains, inc. 
Board-U-21488 &U-21525 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on exceptions filed by both the City of White 
Plains (City) in Case No. U-21525 and by the Police Benevolent Association of 
the City of White Plains, Inc. (PBA) in Case No. U-21488, to a decision of the 
Assistant-Director-olPublic-EmploymenLPractices and_Representation_(Assistant 
Director) which found that both parties had violated §209-a of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting certain demands to interest 
arbitration which constituted nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The 
Assistant Director ordered the PBA to withdraw its proposals numbered 8, 12 
and 13 and the City to withdraw its proposed numbered 13 from consideration at 
compulsory interest arbitration. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant Director. 
FACTS 
On February 2, 2000, the PBA filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration. On February 14, 2000, the City filed its improper practice charge 
alleging that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by submitting certain 
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining to interest arbitration. (Case No. U-21488) 
On March 2, 2000, the PBA filed its improper practice charge against the City 
alleging that it violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it submitted a nonmandatory 
subject of bargaining to the interest arbitration panel in response to the PBA's 
demands. (Case No. U-21525) 
Board-U-21488& U-21525 
The parties stipulated to the facts and exhibits in lieu of a hearing. The 
Assistant Director consolidated the cases for decision based upon the stipulat.ed 
facts. 
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR DECISION 
The Assistant Director-determined_thaLthe_proposalsJn dispute-submitted 
by both parties constituted nonmandatory subjects of bargaining and ordered 
them withdrawn from compulsory interest arbitration. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA, in Case No. U-21488, excepted to the Assistant Director's 
decision on the law and the facts. The City, in Case No. U-21525, excepted to 
) the Assistant Director's decision on the law. 
DISCUSSION 
Case No. U-21488 
PBA Proposal #8 
This proposal adds new language to section 24 entitled Grievance 
Procedure of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The City objects 
specifically to subsections (C), (D) and (F) of proposal #8. The City correctly 
argues that subsections (C) and (F) are nonmandatory subjects because they 
involve procedures to be followed in the event of an internal criminal or 
administrative investigation. Subsection (D) is nonmandatory because it is too 
vague and, thus, ambiguous. 
) 
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We concur with the Assistant Director's analysis of those proposals in light 
of our prior holdings on these issues. 
We turn to the exceptions raised by both parties to the specific findings 
made by the Assistant Director upon the Stipulation and Facts before him. 
I^^The-PBA-excepts to4he-Assistant-Directoris4inding thaUhe 
Grievance Proposal must be considered as a single 
package and, therefore, he found it to be nonmandatory in 
its entirety based on the nonmandatory aspect of some of its 
parts. 
The PBA excepts to the Assistant Director's decision that proposal #8 is a 
unitary demand and, as such, nonmandatory because it contains a mixture of 
both mandatory and nonmandatory subjects. We have held that where a 
bargaining proposal contains two or more inseparable elements , i.e., a unitary 
demand, at least one of which is nonmandatory, the entire proposal is deemed 
nonmandatory.1 The Assistant Director correctly notes that we previously held, in 
Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Association,2 that a proposal for a 
!See Poughkeepsie Prof'i Fire Fighters'Ass'n, Local 596, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 33 PERB 
H3029 (2000), citing City of Oneida, 15 PERB1J3096 (1982); CSEA, Inc., Niagara Chapter, 
14 PERB U3049 (1981); Amherst Police Club, Inc., 12 PERB 1f3071 (1979); City of 
Rochester, 12 PERB 1J3010 (1979); Town of Haverstraw, 11 PERB 1J3109 (1978), 
confirmed in relevant part sub. nom. Town of Haverstraw v. PERB, 12 PERB 1J7007 
(Rockland County Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd 75 AD2d 874, 13 PERB 1J7006 (2d Dep't 1980); 
Pearl River Union Free Sch. Dist, 11 PERB 1J3085 (1978). 
221 PERB 1J3022 (1988). 
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procedure which "is applicable to criminal investigations as well as to internal 
disciplinary investigations" is a nonmandatory subject of negotiations.3 
We also agree with the Assistant Director that proposal #8 is not 
somehow rendered mandatory under the Board's conversion theory adopted in 
City-otCohoes^(hereaiterJ2o/7oes^.iWhile_s^ 
Procedure, of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, a mandatory subject 
of negotiations, proposal #8 adds new language to this article which is not 
related to the parties' grievance mechanism. Consequently, we cannot agree 
that proposal #8 is subject to the conversion theory of negotiations and, thus, 
PBA's exception is denied. 
2. The PBA's demand regarding overtime would take away 
management's rights to unilaterally change staffing 
levels. 
The PBA has submitted a proposal that is not a demand for compensation 
to be paid at an overtime rate but rather a demand that would give the 
employees the unfettered right to work overtime without regard for existing 
staffing needs. The Assistant Director correctly points to our decision in Town of 
Carmel,5 where we held, and the Appellate Division confirmed, that it is a 
3Supra note 2 at 3049; see also Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of Newburgh, New 
York, Inc., 18 PERB fl3065 (1985). 
431 PERB H3020 (1998), confirmed, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup. Ct. Albany County, 
1999) (appeal pending). 
531 PERB H3006, at 3009 (1996), confirmed, 267 AD2d 858, 32 PERB H7028 (3d 
Dep't1999). 
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managerial prerogative to set and change minimum staffing levels. 
Consequently, the creation and filling of positions is a nonmandatory subject.6 
The PBA's exception is denied. 
3. The PBA excepts to the Assistant Director's finding that 
the conversion theory does not convert nonmandatory 
— matters-already4n-a-contraGtand4t-does-not convert 
nonmandatory topics into mandatory topics merely 
because they are to be added to mandatory subject 
matter in a contract. 
The PBA's proposal #13 sought to grant employees on maternity leave of 
over sixty calendar days duration the right to accrue vacation time. 
The parties' collective bargaining agreement addresses the accrual of 
vacation time and expressly disqualifies any employee who is on leave of 
absence, paid or unpaid, exceeding sixty calendar days, from accruing vacation 
time. The Assistant Director noted our decision in City of Rochester7 where we 
held that a demand that would have treated pregnancy and childbirth leave 
differently from other types of leave to be nonmandatory. In addition, the Court of 
Appeals has held that such a demand is discriminatory.8 
The PBA misapprehends the rationale of Cohoes.9 We held in Cohoes 
that the conversion theory was limited to nonmandatory subjects of 
6See Erie County Water Authority, 27 PERB 1J3010 (1994); Town of Henrietta, 25 
PERB 1J6501 (1992); Churchviiie-Chili Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB p 0 5 5 (1984). 
712 PERB lf3010 (1979). 
8See Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 
NY2d 371, 378 (1974). 
9Supra note 4. 
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negotiation and had no application to prohibited subjects. Since the PBA's 
proposal #13 is discriminatory in nature, it is a prohibited subject and outside the 
scope of negotiations. The PBA's exception is denied. 
Case No. U-21525 
The Cityls-proposal #13 soughtto_ad.cLlarjg.uag.eJoL^theJ3eneraLP_rovisions 
section of the parties' collective bargaining agreement which waives the 
protection afforded employees under §58(4)(c) of the Civil Service Law, to wit: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 58 
(4)(c), any employee who has received permanent appointment as 
a police officer and is temporarily assigned to perform the duties of 
a detective shall not, whenever the assignment exceeds 18 months 
in duration, be appointed as a detective and shall not receive the 
compensation ordinarily paid to a detective performing those 
duties. 
The PBA objected to such proposal as a nonmandatory subject. The 
Assistant Director agreed and found the proposal to be nonmandatory. The City 
excepted to the decision on the ground that the Assistant Director determined 
the City's reliance on Steinman v. Village of Spring Valley (hereafter Steinman)™ 
was misplaced. We agree with the Assistant Director's analysis. 
Civil Service Law §58(4)(a) expressly declares the legislature's intent by 
stating that: 
it is frequently impracticable to ascertain fitness for the positions of 
detective and investigator... by means of competitive examination 
. . . . The Legislature further finds that competitive examination has 
never been employed in many police . . . departments, to ascertain 
10261 AD2d 548 (2d Dep't 1999). 
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fitness for the positions of detective and investigator. . . ; such 
fitness has always been determined by evaluation of capabilities of 
an individual (who has . . . received permanent appointment to the 
position of police officer. . .) by supervisory personnel. The 
Legislature further finds that an individual who performs in an 
investigatory position . . . for a period of eighteen months, has 
demonstrated fitness for the position of detective or investigator 
within such police . . . department at least as sufficiently as could 
be^ascertainedby-means-of a competitive-examination — 
In Steinman, the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's denial of a 
police officer's Article 78 petition. The lower court found that the police officer 
was not entitled to continue as a detective even though he performed those 
duties more than eighteen months. The court found that he acted as a detective 
in a supervisory capacity which took him out of the protection afforded by 
i §58(4)(c). Furthermore, §16 of the Rockland County Police Act, a special act, 
took precedence over the inconsistent provision of the Civil Service Law. This 
Act gave the police chiefs authority to assign officers to detective duty and to 
revoke such assignments "at will". 
We determined in Cohoes" that an employer's demand to alter a statutory 
right that may affect a term and condition of employment is mandatorily 
negotiable, unless such a demand is against public policy or has otherwise been 
prohibited by a plain and clear expression of legislative intent. 
The legislative intent expressly stated in §58(4)(c) of the Civil Service Law 
could not be any clearer and since the City's proposal mirrors the statutory 
J 
11
 Supra note 4 at 3043. 
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language contained in §58(4)(c), the City's proposal #13 is foreclosed by the 
statute and is, therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The City's 
exceptions are denied. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's decision is 
affirmed and the PBA's exceptions and the City's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the PBA withdraw its proposals #8, #12, 
and #13 and that the City withdraw its proposal #13 from consideration at 
compulsory interest arbitration. 
DATED: October 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROSEANNE LEGRAND, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-21730 
- and -
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 




j - and -
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
CYNTHIA DICKSTEIN, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-21733 
-and -
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
ROSEANNE LEGRAND, JEANNETTA WALSH AND CYNTHIA DICKSTEIN, 
pro se 
Case Nos. U-21730, U-21732, U-21733 -2-
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on exceptions filed by Roseanne Legrand, Jeannetta 
Walsh and Cynthia Dickstein (charging parties), pro se, to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing their improper 
practice charges. The charging parties filed separate charges, each alleging that the 
Council of Supervisors and Administrators of the City of New York, Local 1, AFL-CIO 
(CSA), violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it failed to implement a side-letter agreement reached during collective 
bargaining for its current contract with the Board of Education of the City School District 
of the City of New York (District). 
FACTS 
On May 30, 2000, the charging parties filed their identical charges with PERB. 
They alleged that the CSA and the District entered into a new agreement on January 
31, 2000. As a result of those negotiations, a side-letter agreement was also made 
which stated that the District's "Division of Human Resources will audit and re-evaluate 
positions identified by the Superintendent/Executive Director where newly assigned 
Educational Administrators Level II (EA ll's) are making higher salaries than EA ll's 
serving in comparable positions in the same district/office. Where warranted, 
reclassification of positions to set salary rates will be implemented."1 
1See Improper Practice Charges. 
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The charging parties alleged that guidelines on the actual implementation have 
not as yet been issued. They contacted CSA and were advised by CSA that "things are 
in the works," however, they allege, nothing has materialized. 
On June 1, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation-(Assistant^Director)-sent^a notiGe-of-deficiency4othe-chargingparties 
advising them that their charges were deficient and the reasons therefor. On June 19, 
2000, the charging parties submitted their first amendment. On June 19, 2000, the 
Assistant Director sent a second deficiency letter to them. On July 6, 2000, an 
extension to file an amendment was granted to July 21, 2000. On July 20, 2000, the 
second amendment was received from the charging parties. 
The charging parties failed to respond to the second deficiency notice and 
accordingly their charges were dismissed. They except to the Director's decision on 
factual grounds, which includes facts which were not contained in the original charges 
or the amendment to their charges. 
DISCUSSION 
We have consistently held that the duty of fair representation is breached upon a 
showing of conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.2 Since we are loath 
to substitute our judgment for that of CSA, we have established a limited basis upon 
which a breach of duty of fair representation may be shown. Absent evidence that an 
2See CSEA, Local 1000 (Heffelfinger), 32 PERB 1J3044 (1999); CSEA v. PERB 
and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB U7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 
NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1T7017 (1988). 
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action taken is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, a violation of the representation 
duty will not be found.3 
The Assistant Director advised the charging parties of the deficiencies contained 
within their respective charges. The amendments which followed did not address those 
deficiencies. Instead, the charging parties submitted documents which failed to specify 
how CSA's conduct as it relates to the side-letter agreement was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. It is not our role to search through documents in an effort 
to discern and articulate the existence of a charge.4 
Upon our review of the pleadings, we find that the charging parties have failed to 
make a prima facie showing of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part 
of CSA. While charging parties allege that CSA was careless, inept and ineffective in 
the manner in which it handled their complaints, we, as well as the courts, have held 
that such allegations do not evidence a breach of the duty of fair representation.5 
Based on the foregoing, the charging parties' exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the Director is affirmed. 
3Public Employee's Fed'n AFL-CIO and State of New York (Dep't of Health), 29 
PERB H3027(1996). 
4See State of New York (Workers' Compensation Bd.) and CSEA, Inc., 29 PERB 
H3054 (1996); State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Security and Law Enforcement, 
Council 82, AFSCME, 27 PERB 1(3016 (1994). 
5Supra note 2. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 24, 2000 
Albany, New York (Mu^^o^-r^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 342, United Marine Division, 
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Local 342) to an Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which dismissed Local 342's petition for unit clarification 
and placement of the newly created position of Town Park Supervisor I (Town Park 
Supervisor). 
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The Town of Huntington (Town), at the time this position was created, placed it in 
the "white collar" unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). On February 4, 2000, CSEAwas granted 
leave to intervene and a hearing was held upon the issues on February 17, 2000. 
ALJ-DeGision 
The ALJ decided that the recognition clause of the Town-Local 342 collective 
bargaining agreement did not specifically include the title of Town Park Supervisor and 
the broadly worded reference in the contract to "all supervisory employees" was not 
conclusive. Thus, the unit clarification aspect of the petition was dismissed. 
As to the unit placement aspect of the petition, the ALJ inquired into the most 
appropriate unit for this title. She found no community of interest between the new title 
of Town Park Supervisor and the existing supervisory titles represented by Local 342 
and, therefore, also dismissed the unit placement aspect of the decision. 
Exceptions 
Local 342 excepts to the ALJ decision as to unit clarification on the grounds that 
the ALJ failed to acknowledge the plain language of the recognition clause of the Town-
Local 342 collective bargaining agreement. In addition, with respect to unit placement, 
Local 342 argues that the background of the incumbent (Todd McGowan) is consistent 
with that of other supervisors represented by Local 342. Furthermore, his job 
description is similar to other supervisors of Local 342. Lastly, Local 342 argues.that 
the Town ignored public policy by unilaterally determining the unit in which McGowan's 
title was placed. 
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Facts 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. We shall, therefore, confine 
our review to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions filed by Local 342. 
The recognition clause of the collective bargaining agreement between Local 
342-and -t-h-e-T-ow-n-Gover-s-^ all supervisory employees", includingbut-not4imited-to 
several other titles specifically listed. However, Town Park Supervisor was not among 
the titles specifically listed. Local 342's supervisory unit generally consists of labor 
supervisors. 
The title "Town Park Supervisor" resulted from consultations by the Town with 
the County civil service commission. The Town originally used another title for the 
position but the commission rejected that title because it was already in use. The 
purpose of creating the position was to hire an employee who could oversee Heckscher 
Park, regarded by many to be the Town's "crown jewel". Heckscher Park had been 
neglected for many years and had been the subject of community complaints. 
The primary role of the Town Park Supervisor is to manage Heckscher Park and 
not supervise Town employees. McGowan was hired from a civil service list, 
possesses a master gardener license and, most recently, supervised a park in Albany, 
New York. In addition to managing the park, he is responsible for interacting with civic 
groups, elected officials, Town maintenance employees, Town highway department 
employees and the Director of Parks and Recreation. 
CSEA represents a unit of "white collar" supervisors, including, among others, 
Inventory Control Supervisor, Print Shop Supervisor, Parking Meter Supervisor, 
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Recreational Supervisor, Senior Citizens Program Supervisor, Town Maintenance 
Supervisor, and Waterways Management Supervisor. The incumbents in these titles 
are responsible for programs or projects. Some supervise personnel, directly, as a part 
of their job duties, and some of the employees supervised are in Local 342's unit. 
By-Gomparison,-Local 342^s-supervisors area-blue collar— unit,-such-as-Labor 
Crew Leader IV, Park Maintenance Supervisor IV and Labor Crew Leader III. The blue 
collar supervisors are typically maintenance crew leaders who are trained in the trades 
and have supervision over subordinates as their primary role. 
McGowan was placed in the CSEA unit by the Town because neither of the 
collective bargaining agreements between the Town and Local 342 nor the Town and 
CSEA contained the title of Town Park Supervisor in its recognition clause. The Town 
believed that based on the duties the title had a greater community of interest with the 
"white collar" supervisors in the CSEA unit. 
Discussion 
Local 342 argues that the ALJ failed to acknowledge the plain language of its 
recognition clause. The phrase "all supervisory employees" contained in its recognition 
clause should, therefore, include the title of Town Park Supervisor. This argument is 
rejected. 
We have previously held that "[a] unit clarification petition seeks only a factual 
determination as to whether a job title is actually encompassed within the scope of the 
petitioner's unit. We have held a unit clarification petitioner to a burden of proof on its 
petition because that particular type of petition necessarily seeks only a determination 
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of fact."1 A unit clarification petition raises only a fact question as to whether the at-
issue personnel are included in the existing unit.2 Where the language in the 
recognition clause is general and is not title specific, the inquiry goes beyond the 
language of the recognition clause to determine whether any other contractual 
language-either-coversjDr-specifica^ 
relevant contractual language, the parties' practice with respect to the at-issue title or 
similar titles is reviewed to ascertain the parties' intent.4 
The recognition clause in the Town-Local 342 collective bargaining agreement 
includes "all supervisory employees", including, but not limited to, several specific titles. 
The at-issue title is not among those listed. The Town-CSEA collective bargaining 
agreement includes several "supervisor" titles also. We affirm the ALJ's finding that the 
recognition clause in question is overly broad and that the unit clarification aspect of the 
petition should be dismissed. 
We also reject Local 342's exceptions regarding the ALJ's dismissal of the unit 
placement petition. A unit placement petition puts the appropriateness of the unit under 
1
 Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3007, at 3021 (2000), citing 
State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), 24 PERB P019 (1991). 
2County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERB fl3049 (1992), 
confirmed sub nom. Orange County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. PERB, 26 PERB tf7004 
(Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1993). 
3General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB fl3065 (1995); County of Niagara, 21 
PERB H3030(1988). 
4County of Niagara, supra. See also Clinton Community Coll., 31 PERB P070 
(1998). 
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§207 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in issue. "Moreover, the unit 
placement petition proceeds from the finding or admission that the position in issue is 
not in the petitioner's unit, but should be most appropriately placed there."5 (emphasis 
added) 
-Since the4itle-of^own-Park-Supem^^ 
Town placed McGowan in the CSEA unit because it believed it was the most 
appropriate given the nature of his work. This determination should not be disturbed 
especially in light of the community of interest factors discussed by the ALJ in her 
decision. 
The ALJ's decision accurately reflects in material respects a record which 
distinguishes the work performed by the Town Park Supervisor from the blue collar 
supervisors represented by Local 342. She noted the differences in the factors which 
make up community of interest such as work rules, personnel policies, contractual 
benefits and civil service status. 
Furthermore, as we have held, "Any questions under a community of interest 
criterion as to the appropriateness of continuing the placement of the [affected 
employee] in the [CSEA] unit are removed upon application of the 'administrative 
convenience' uniting criteria in §207.1 (c) of the Act. That criterion requires weight be 
given to an employer's uniting preference."6 
5State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control), supra note 1 at 3038. 
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Local 342's policy exception is also rejected based upon our application of the 
employer's administrative convenience uniting criteria as set forth in Malone Central 
School District, supra. 
Based upon the record before us and our consideration of the parties' 
-arguments_we-affirmth^ L__ 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
i
^ ' U < 4 ^ A / < : : ^ - ~&~7 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
.; 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SENECA FALLS SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4954 
SENECA FALLS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Seneca Falls Support Staff Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All support staff personnel hereafter listed: Assistant 
Cook, Cook Manager, Food Service Helper* Senior 
Food Service Helper, Baker, School Lunch Cashier, 
CMeiejlaJ^o_iiito^_Aud.LO_Vis_ual.Aide,.Typist,.Head 
Building Maintenance Mechanic, Senior Stenographer 
(12 mos.) at Bldg. Level, Mechanic, Bus Dispatcher, 
Stenographer (11 mos.), Stenographer (12 mos.), 
Building Maintenance Mechanic, Senior Custodian, 
Custodian, Head Automotive Mechanic, Automotive 
Mechanic, Bus Driver, Cafeteria Aide, Teacher Aide, 
Bus Monitor, Mechanic-Bus Driver, Senior Typist, 
Library Aide, Groundskeeper, Food Transporter, Child 
Associate, Data Entry Machine Operator, General 
Mechanic/Automotive. 
Head Custodian, Business Manager, Superintendent 
of Buildings and Grounds, Building Maintenance 
Supervisor, Cafeteria Supervisor, Transportation 
Supervisor, and District Office Personnel. District 
Office Personnel to include Secretary to 
Superintendent, District Treasurer, and rib more than 
two (2) other full-time equivalent positions. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Seneca Falls Support Staff Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
Excluded: 
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requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either'party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
C^U^c^uJj^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^ " MaYc A^Abbott, MembeK r 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
